
Thursday, July 10, 2008
By Wendy Kaminer, Barack Obama is poised to become “our first president who is a civil libertarian,” Jeffrey Rosen wrote hopefully and not without reason, less than 6 months ago. But it didn’t take long for the audacity of politics to expose the naivete of hope. Today, given Obama’s support for the grossly and gratuitously anti-libertarian FISA amendments (painstakingly explored by the tireless Glenn Greenwald,) civil libertarians are likely to vote for him with a lot more resignation than enthusiasm. Today, Obama is merely poised to become a president who would be more sensitive to civil liberty than John McCain and would leave us with a centrist Supreme Court rather than a right wing extremist one. That’s change we can manage to tolerate.
Too bad that a candidate who ran against political cynicism is now encouraging it, but we should have known better than to hope that a presidential candidate would look favorably upon limiting presidential power. It’s no coincidence that a nation founded on a dream of individual liberty (for some) over 225 years ago still awaits a civil libertarian president. Jefferson had his moments, as Harvey Silverglate suggested here, but no slaveholder can be called a civil libertarian. James Madison had his moments too, but both Jefferson and Madison made their primary contributions to liberty in imagining the nation, not presiding over it. If Obama wins the presidency (and I continue to hope that he does) he will (like virtually all presidents) guard the prerogatives of power that civil libertarians seek to restrict.
Congress and the courts will often fail us too (as passage of the FISA amendments showed,) but for all their faults, Congress and the courts probably offer the best checks against the apparently irresistible temptations of the imperial presidency. Even a right of center Supreme Court has required the Administration to provide at least minimal due process to Guantanamo detainees. Even the reliably craven Congress includes some good civil libertarians (see who voted against the FISA amendments,) and Democrats in Congress derive whatever strength they can muster from numbers. The ’08 Senate races are perhaps as important as the race for the White House, which civil libertarians should always regard as alien territory. Approach the president as a friend or allow him to embrace you as one, and instead of opposing his power you’ll probably be seduced by proximity to it. Civil libertarianism is a game for outsiders.
Wednesday, January 09, 2008
By Wendy Kaminer
Identity politics seemed to have worked for Hillary Clinton in New Hampshire, after all, and given the unseemly glee with which so many pundits predicted her demise, given their gratuitous brutality toward her, I confess to feeling pleased and even vindicated by the support she received from women. I'm not a member of the Hillary fan club (I'm uneasy with her centrist, communitarian instincts,) and I recoil from the notion of voting on the basis of sex, race, or any other demographic category. But when the usual blowhards mocked what seemed to me an authentic, entirely appropriate display of emotion and concern for the state of the nation, when Keith Olbermann even criticized Clinton for saying that "some of us are right and some of us are wrong" (what was she supposed to say, "vote for Obama?") I felt an atavistic urge to stand by her; and I can't help being glad that so many women did.
Tuesday, January 08, 2008
NBC reports that a group of abortion protesters disrupted a Barack Obama rally in New Hampshire. Though the police came to usher the protesters out, Obama’s response seems to suggest that he understands the old notion of disagreeing with you but fighting for your right to say it:
“Let me just say this though. Some people got organized to do that [protest]. That’s part of the American tradition we’re proud of. And that’s hard too, standing in the midst of people who disagree with you and letting your voice be heard.” (emphasis added)
As a former president of the Harvard Law Review and then lecturer in constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School, Obama surely has an understanding of what the First Amendment entails. If he gets the nomination, it will be interesting to see his views on civil liberties come out.
Via Reality-Based Community
Friday, January 04, 2008
By
Wendy Kaminer
It’s easy to overestimate or over-hype the implications of
the Iowa caucus results, but it does seem clear that Hillary Clinton needs to
re-evaluate her reputed reliance on the “women’s vote.” Reportedly, while
Clinton had the edge with older women (and anecdotal evidence showed that
elderly women found her especially appealing) Obama captured women under 35.
The last results I heard before retiring last night gave Clinton less than a
third of the women‘s vote in Iowa.
Iowa caucus women refused to play
identity politics. Emily’s List, which worked hard for Clinton, is no doubt
disappointed, and some are bound to regard Clinton’s relatively poor showing
among women as a feminist failure. I find it refreshing, although I can only
speculate about its causes, which may not be so lofty: Maybe younger women see
Clinton as a mother, whose grasp they are trying to escape, while elderly women
regard her as a daughter, who can fulfill aspirations that they could never contemplate.
In any case, why should any feminist cheer women
with a bias in favor of female candidates and jeer men with a bias in favor of
males? If the willingness of white voters to support an African-American
candidate is a sign of progress and enlightenment, why is it regressive, or even
a betrayal, for African-Americans to support a white candidate?
Of
course, I know the many explanations that might be offered in response,
involving the historic oppression and continuing discrimination suffered by
black males and all women, and the difference between majority and minority
biases. But shouldn’t we look forward to elections in which no groups practice
identity politics instead of elections in which only some groups do?
Saturday, October 06, 2007
By Wendy Kaminer
Thanks to Burton Hanson for alerting us to a ruling by the Supreme Court of Washington State striking down a law that barred political candidates from knowingly or recklessly making false statements about their opponents. This was an easy case: if the First Amendment means anything at all, it means that government officials may not restrict the content of political speech, as the majority recognized: “The notion that government, rather than the people, may be the final arbiter of truth in political debate is fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment,” Justice James Johnson wrote, in Rickert v Public Disclosure Commission. “(T)here simply cannot be any legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in permitting government censors to vet and penalize political speech …”
Justice Johnson’s loud and clear defense of political speech is elementary. Yet it prevailed by only one vote: Rickert is a 5-4 decision. In an equally emphatic dissent, Justice Barbara Madsen observed that many other states had statutes proscribing knowingly false statements about candidates; that the state had obvious, constitutional power to “regulate truth or falsity of political speech;“ and that “the use of calculated falsehood is not constitutionally protected.” By striking down the Washington state law, she stated, the majority was inviting campaigns to “lie with impunity.” If this sounds reasonable or even arguable to you, consider precisely how the government would determine what constituted deliberate lying in a political campaign, under Washington state law. The official truth squad is something called the “Public Disclosure Commission.” Who would get to serve on this powerful commission? The majority stressed that PDC members “are appointed by the governor, a political officer. This group of unelected officials is empowered not only to review alleged false statements made in political campaigns but also to impose sanctions.” The possibility (or perhaps probability) that the commission’s notion of truth would reflect its political biases as well as ordinary human fallibility, seem clear, yet the statute did not require that the PDC’s decision be subjected to independent judicial review.
Consider too the facts in the Rickert case: Marilou Rickert, a green party candidate, falsely stated that, Tim Sheldon, her democratic opponent in a state senate race, had voted to close “a facility for the developmentally challenged.” (Rickert was touting her allegedly superior commitment to social services.) Sheldon filed a complaint with the PDC. He won the election with 79% of the vote. Nevertheless, the PDC found that Rickert had told two lies about Sheldon’s record and fined her $1,000.
How were the voters of Washington state served by this decision? Rickert’s falsehood apparently had no appreciable effect on the election. But if allowed to stand, the PDC’s ruling would likely have chilled political speech in subsequent elections, making clear that candidates for public office should watch what they say, to avoid incurring the wrath of the governor’s appointees.
It’s worth stressing that Washington law did not simply authorize government control of political speech; in effect, it authorized political control of political speech. At best, the notion that a political body like the PDC could be trusted to decide whether a candidate’s speech was sufficiently honest was unwise, even irrational. Or as Justice Johnson wrote, the law “naively assumes that the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech. Yet political speech is usually as much opinion as fact.”
It’s interesting: “good government” advocates, who are generally behind “reforms” like the Washington state law, don’t trust voters or the press to distinguish between true and false speech; they don’t trust political candidates to conduct honest campaigns. Yet they do trust elected officials and their unelected appointees to monitor the content of a candidate’s speech. Their mistrust of candidates, the press, and even the perceptiveness of many voters is perhaps understandable, although their remedies are unconstitutional. What makes no sense is their trust of government officials. Every elected official is a former candidate. If candidates can’t be trusted to conduct themselves honestly during their campaigns, why trust them once they ascend to office – particularly if you’re inclined to believe that some candidates win by lying to voters. (I assume that advocates of the Washington statute believe that lying helps determine elections; why else would they seek to regulate it?)
And who promulgated Washington state’s electoral censorship scheme? State legislators – former political candidates all. Like many campaign laws (naturally passed by sitting legislators,) this one may have been designed to protect incumbents, who often have easier races and less need than their challengers to engage in aggressive or provocative campaign speech. Or maybe the legislators simply trust themselves not to lie – or not to get caught lying. But they sure don’t trust their opponents, much less their constituents, whose gullibility they presume. So if I were a Washington state voter, I’d throw the bums out. People shouldn’t trust with power government officials who don’t trust the people with freedom.
Sunday, July 29, 2007
If money isn’t speech, as advocates of campaign finance restrictions wishfully insist, then why does your local NPR station persist in conducting those annoying pledge drives? If money isn’t speech, why does Rupert Murdoch want to own the Wall Street Journal? Why do unprofitable political publications require financial angels to survive? Of course, money is speech, in effect, as Harvey observes below, (and as crtitics of campaign finance restrictions regularly point out; we have been having this argument for years.) Money translates into speech, just as money translates into reproductive choice or access to equal education. Like it or not, money facilitates the exercise of rights. You can protest or lament that fact, but you cannot wish or declare it away. Because money is speech, (at least until the revolution,) just as money is reproductive choice, some civil libertarians advocate alternative, public financing schemes for political campaigns, as Harvey describes. Their goal is to expand, not restrict, opportunities for political speech. Similarly, liberal supporters of abortion rights advocate publicly funded abortions for women in need. They seek to subsidize reproductive health care for poor women, not limit the care that rich women can buy for themselves. Public financed political campaigns are complicated and rightly controversial. How should government officials determine who is eligible for campaign subsidies; should taxpayers be required to provide financial support for candidates they oppose? But, for all their flaws, at least proposals to subsidize political candidates are efforts to address reality, not deny it.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
There was a show-tune ditty that was popular back when I was a kid, which younger readers might also identify as the theme song to Married With Children. “Love and marriage,” went the lyric, “go together like a horse and carriage. This, I tell you, brother: You can’t have one without the other.” In quite the same way, in the context of electoral politics, you can’t have speech without money.
While the internet has made engaging in free speech without a lot of money more feasible than ever, it remains true—especially in the context of campaigning for public office—that money remains the mother’s milk of politics. Of course, that is why the monthly reports on the relative viability of various candidates in both major parties focus not so much on opinion polls, but on fund-raising totals. Even though the amount of popular support a candidate enjoys ultimately affects his or her success at the ballot box, candidates without substantial cash on hand find it prohibitively difficult to make their case.
The problem is that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act— better known as McCain-Feingold—has significantly interfered with the ability of third party candidates and other political mavericks to gather together enough funds to inject dynamism and fresh ideas into a political system badly in need of change. (That act recently survived its latest examination by the Supreme Court even though its impact on pure political speech was significantly diluted.)
It’s hard to avoid the suspicion that Congress’ professed concern about the corrupting role of money in the political system may simply be a case of crocodile tears, since the percentage of incumbents being re-elected is about as high these days as it’s ever been. This logic leads to the conclusion that the advent of campaign financing law—beginning with The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971—failed to create a cleaner, more vigorous political system. Instead, it led to a system in which the obstacles that new and maverick candidates face when launching electoral challenges to incumbents have become so overwhelming that during every election cycle nearly all incumbents get re-elected to the House and Senate. The cost of challenging an incumbent has skyrocketed. All of this might lead a cynic to conclude that campaign finance “reform” is simply a palatable cover for incumbent protection.
The reality of campaign finance restrictions is that they make it harder, not easier, for new voices to be heard, or for challenges against incumbents to be launched. This has occurred because the restrictions make it difficult for newcomers to the political system to overcome the inherent fund-raising and communications advantages of incumbency. In the celebrated 1976 case of Buckley v Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld campaign finance restrictions in principle and rejected rejecting an overall First Amendment attack, even though the court held that certain kinds of money flows, such as personal funds spent by a wealthy candidate for his own campaign, could not be restricted. I hear my fellow liberals chant about the necessity of freeing politics from the grip of big money, but in fact big money manages rather well to find its way into the political system. It’s those who oppose business-as-usual who are unable to buy the time and venues for being heard by the voters.
In addition to this reality comes what should be obvious to readers of The Free For All—that restricting campaign contributions is a backdoor way of restricting free speech that is, or should be, protected by the First Amendment. This has long made me a supporter of the ACLU’s proposed solution. In 2001, it wrote a letter to the Senate opposing McCain-Feingold, in which it noted sarcastically that the act was “misnamed as ‘The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001,’” and was in reality “a destructive distraction from the serious business of meaningful campaign reform.” What is needed, noted the ACLU’s letter, is “a more First Amendment-friendly way to expand political opportunity.” This would entail “public financing for all qualified candidates…without the imposition of burdensome and unconstitutional limits and restraints” on political fund-raising. The ACLU’s commonsense – and constitutional – position on campaign finance is consistent with the position championed for decades by the organization’s now-retired executive director, Ira Glasser, who recommended that the law remove the ceiling from political fundraising by abolishing restrictions on how much a candidate may raise and from whom. Instead, the proposed solution would institute a floor – a minimal amount of public funding for viable and credible candidates so that they might increase the amount of political speech heard at election-time. “Examinations of many campaigns,” testified Glasser before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on 3/22/2000, “suggest that if the floor of support is adequate, there is no need to impose a ceiling.” The goal, after all, should be to expand rather than contract the amount of political speech. Liberals who support campaign finance laws that restrict free speech by restricting money are barking up the wrong tree. All they will assure is that we won’t be able to throw the damned rascals out.
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
By Wendy Kaminer
Civil libertarians have good reason to mourn the Supreme Court’s latest rulings eviscerating student speech rights and empowering the president to divert public funds to sectarian religious groups. In the wake of the Court’s earlier decision this term upholding bans on second trimester abortions, these cases confirm that the Court is now pretty firmly under the control of authoritarian (not libertarian) conservatives. Occasionally the conservative majority will rule in favor of liberty; expect it to do so when the liberty interests align with the interests or biases of conservatives, as they do in debates about campaign finance restrictions. The “liberal” wing of the Court, which in saner times would be described as centrist (with the possible exception of Justice Ginsberg,) dissented from Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion in the campaign finance case, which limited a provision of the McCain Feingold law that greatly restricted the political speech of corporations and unions. Naturally, many liberals and other reformers intent on somehow divorcing money from politics (an effort akin to trying to divorce teenagers from sex,) considered this ruling another defeat.
But McCain Feingold is an illiberal bill that restricts much more than the speech of presumptively “evil” corporate speakers. The provision struck down by the Court also applied to not for profit advocacy groups, like the NRA, NARAL, and the ACLU, and it prohibited these groups, as well as corporations and unions, from using general funds to broadcast “electioneering communications” that merely mentioned a candidate’s name 30 days before a federal primary and 60 days before a general election. What was an electioneering communication under McCain Feingold? It included “issue ads,” like an ad by a gay rights group that said, “Call Congressman X and tell him how you feel about a constitutional amendment prohibiting gay marriage.”
It should be obvious that this restriction on “issue ads” was an unconstitutional restriction on core political speech, which the Court rightly rejected. And, surely, reformers interested in good government should vigorously oppose laws like McCain Feingold that criminalize ads criticizing members of Congress (or their positions on public issues) during their re-election campaigns. (No one should be surprised that a campaign law enacted by incumbent legislators benefits incumbents.) But I suspect that a lot of people reflexively support campaign finance restrictions in the mistaken belief that they simply muzzle fat cats bent on corrupting the process. In fact, they muzzle ordinary citizens (as former FEC chair Bradley Smith explains in the WSJ.) And, in some ways, they enhance rather than restrict the advantages of the ultra-rich in election campaigns, as the proliferation of 527's has shown. Restrictions on issue ads and similar “reforms” also translate into law the familiar, lamentable, de facto principle that a free press belongs to those who own it. As many of us have observed, McCain Feingold potentially amplifies the voices of press titans, like Arthur Sulzberger and Rupert Murdoch, who retain their rights to publish editorials discussing issues or directly attacking candidates whenever they choose, while advocacy groups, representing millions of individual citizens who don’t own newspapers or radio stations, effectively lose the right to purchase broadcast time for similar purposes. But, you’d never know this from reading the New York Times editorial page; in criticizing the campaign finance decision, the Times accused the Court of “magnifying the voice of wealthy corporations and unions over the voice of candidates and private citizens,” resorting to precisely the kind of misleading sloganeering that laws like McCain Feingold are supposed to restrict. So while the Court is not consistent or intellectually honest in its defense of free speech, as the rulings this week show, neither are the New York Times and the many liberals who support McCain Feingold (sometimes without understanding its reach.) This Supreme Court will hand liberals and civil libertarians many more defeats in the coming years; let’s make the most of occasional victories.
Friday, April 27, 2007
The Supreme Court heard yet another round of oral arguments April 25th on the ever-perplexing subject of so-called “campaign financing reform” – the efforts by Congress and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to establish rules to limit, in the pet phrase of supporters of these laws, “the corrupting influence of big money” on our electoral system. I was glad to see that recent Pulitzer Price winner Charlie Savage’s report in the Globe articulated my long-held position that these laws are not only unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee, but also unenforceable and hopelessly indecipherable.
Before the court this month is the disastrous McCain-Feingold Act of 2002, the most momentous and well-publicized, and also the most futile, of the many congressional efforts over the last thirty years to limit the extent to which money influences politics. In a 2003 decision that has been rightly derided by free speech advocates, the court by a vote of 5-4 upheld the constitutionality of the Act’s ban on “soft money” and on TV ads that mention a candidate for federal office within 60 days of a general election.
This time around, the court is debating McCain-Feingold’s exception for certain “issue” ads, which are not considered political endorsements when they do not specifically mention the name of a candidate. It’s difficult, if not impossible, to separate ads touting issues from ads touting pols who support those issues. The insanity of this murky attempted boundary is what has occupied an enormous amount of time of judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers – all without achieving any clarity. The constitutionality of this provision is being challenged by the nonprofit Wisconsin Right to Life, an anti-abortion group. The FEC penalized the group last year for airing ads urging Wisconsinites to contact the state's two U.S. senators and tell them not to filibuster President Bush's judicial nominees. Because one of those senators, Democrat Russell Feingold (coincidentally, one of the campaign finance reforms act’s namesakes), was up for reelection, the group was told that the inclusion of Feingold’s name turned its grass-roots anti-abortion campaign into an "electioneering communication" that could not be legally aired before the election.
As the Wisconsin Right to Life example proves, the McCain-Feingold act, although well-intentioned, clearly tramples on one of the most fundamentally important guarantees of the Constitution: the right for a citizen to criticize one’s government and to petition for what the First Amendment calls “a redress of grievances.” In my view, there needs to be a major shift in the debate over fair elections and a newfound emphasis on restoring some sense of voter and candidate equality and access to the system without sacrificing free speech. Lawmakers should repeal campaign financing restrictions and instead institute a modest system of public financing of campaigns. Every candidate who demonstrates his or her credibility by collecting enough signatures would be eligible for public money to run a campaign. The American Civil Liberties Union has been proposing a system like this for decades, thus far to no avail. What the current system has gotten us is not a diminution in the role of money in politics – that would be simply impossible to achieve in a free society – but, rather, a system where the benefits of incumbency are huge because current officeholders have so much more access to money and to the news media than do the challengers. If we want to throw the bums out, we need to open up the system by getting rid of McCain-Feingold and other such ill-considered and unconstitutional restrictions on the free speech rights of the electorate.
Meanwhile, Congress should abandon this absurd notion that support for issues and support for candidates can, or should, be separated. Citizens and political groups should be able to vocally support candidates however they see fit.. Let free speech and fair elections both flourish.
When rules are written to cut off money in one arena, that money inevitably finds its way into the electoral system through a back door. It’s a constant game of cat-and-mouse. Only a strictly enforced publicly funded campaign system could put this tiresome game to an end and, incidentally, put some of the army of campaign finance lawyers out of business.
We have had some form of campaign finance restrictions for many decades, with the restrictions becoming stricter and stricter with each attempt at “reform.” In order to assess the impact of this effort to “wring big money out of politics,” one has simply to compare the quality of our politics, our political discourse, and our office-holders, with each passing decade. I rest my case.
Some people actually like receiving automated phone messages from political candidates (go figure; some people like watching reality tv;) but recent increases in robocalls have naturally prompted increases in complaints about them. The New York Times reports that more than 20 states are considering restricting their use. Proposed restrictions include barring overnight calls, establishing political no call lists, or even limiting the number of calls a household can receive in one day.
These measures will seem mild to those who consider unsolicited, automated phone calls capital crimes, but, however irritating, candidate robocalls are protected speech. In fact, as political speech, they’re at the core of what the First Amendment protects, and regulating them is not as simple– or ought not be as simple – as many of us might like it to be. Not all regulations raise constitutional or even policy concerns. Legislators should start with reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, barring late night or early morning calls, even imposing 11 or 12 hour bans on calls from, say, 9 AM to 9 PM. But restrictions on the number of calls that can be made to any household a day, even the establishment of political no call lists, are more controversial. While the restrictions can be justified by the invasiveness of unsolicited calls (you can’t ignore your phone quite as easily as you can ignore a tv or radio ad,) they might also be said to impose unacceptable limits on political speech. The calls are “cheap, easy to make, and often highly effective,” according to the Times, which suggests that they might be particularly useful to outsiders challenging incumbents.
But who gets to decide whether and how to limit robocalls? Incumbents -- who are not known for their unselfish approach to electoral reform. We might regard with skepticism the stringent restrictions that incumbent legislators propose for robocalls, just as we might regard with skepticism limits that they place on other forms of electioneering and campaign financing schemes. (Is there any reason to think that incumbent legislators enact campaign finance reform laws that are likely to hurt their chances for re-election?)
Maybe we should stop and consider whether we really need comprehensive regulation of robocalls, beyond time, place and manner restrictions. After all, the more numerous and irritating these calls become, the more they’re apt to backfire on candidates who use them. There may be an effective libertarian approach to the problem of robocalls that vindicates both free speech and irritated voters: Let the market decide.
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